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As a result of demographic change, Canadian governments face a
net liability of $1.4 trillion for healthcare, education, seniors' and
children's programs. Meeting this challenge will require fiscal 
discipline, partial prefunding and growth-friendly policies.
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s Canada’s babyboomers move through middle age and closer to
retirement, a long-anticipated transformation of the country’s
demographic structure is accelerating. In several respects, Canadians
are unprepared for this change. They are still not ready for the dual
challenge of a rapid rise in the share of seniors in the population, and much
slower growth of the workforce. Nor are they ready for the eventual fiscal
consequences — a major rise in the share of income Canadians will need to
devote to publicly funded programs. Barring some wrenching changes in public
finances, this rise will force today’s youngsters to pay higher taxes for their
lifetime package of public programs than their parents and grandparents did.
This Backgrounder puts a dollar figure on that rising tab — the net additional
claims public programs will make on Canadian incomes as a result of
demographic change. It uses a handful of straightforward assumptions about
economic growth, increases in servicing intensity, and inflation. Overlaying
those on projections of Canada’s future population, it calculates the share of
Canadians’ incomes — measured in gross domestic product (GDP) — that will
be needed for programs devoted to health, education, the elderly and children in
the future.
Comparing that cost with the share of income devoted to these same
programs in the recent past gives an indication of the change in the “price”
required to buy a package of services for a person of a given age. Demographic
change will push the price, or share of income, down for some programs such as
family benefits and education. This gives governments a kind of implicit asset:
they could lower taxes or raise spending elsewhere, and yet deliver the same
value per recipient of education or family benefit programs as they do now. For
other programs, mainly healthcare, demographic change will drive the share-of-
income price up. This gives governments an implicit liability: they will need to
raise taxes or cut other programs to deliver the same value per recipient of
healthcare as they do now.
This notion of implicit assets and liabilities lets us put the fiscal impacts of
demographic change into a ledger alongside other more familiar balance-sheet
measures. These include the debts recorded on budgets (which will oblige
governments to charge more in taxes than they deliver in programs in the
future), and the unfunded liabilities of the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans
(C/QPP) (which will oblige future contributors to pay more than an actuarially
fair price for their benefits). The key difference is that Canadians are already
paying interest to cover most of governments’ on-budget debts, and partial pre-
funding of the C/QPP has also brought some of the ultimate costs of those
programs forward in time. By contrast, direct experience of the increased cost of
the demographically driven liabilities still lies in the future. 
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I thank Colin Busby, Yvan Guillemette and Jean-Claude Ménard for comments on an earlier draft.
Responsibility for errors and conclusions is mine alone.Discounted at 4.8 percent over 50 years — the yield on high-quality
provincial-government bonds at the time of writing — demographically driven
programs create a net liability for governments of almost $1.4 trillion. This
burden, however, is unevenly spread. Ottawa comes out in a net asset position,
thanks mainly to prospective declines in spending on children. Provinces, by
contrast, face massive increases in healthcare spending, which falling education
budgets only partially offset.
1 Geographically speaking, the outlook generally
worsens moving from west to east across the country.
These liabilities are considerably larger than public-accounts debts and the
unfunded liabilities of the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans (C/QPP). They
also dwarf the deferred taxes governments will take in when Canadians bring
their pension savings into income. To maintain the current age distribution of
public spending, future taxpayers will need to pay more for their lifetime
package of programs than did their predecessors. Among the steps that could
alleviate this problem are more rigorous spending control and budget surpluses,
further transfers of tax room from Ottawa to the provinces, prefunding of some
healthcare obligations and growth-friendly policies that will boost Canadians’
incomes — the base on which Canada’s social programs ultimately rest.
Estimating Demography’s Impact on Public Programs
The idea behind this assessment of the fiscal implications of demographic
change is simple: to see what would happen if recent patterns of
demographically sensitive spending persist as the populations of Canada and
each province change. It begins with population projections using a handful of
assumptions:
￿ each province’s total fertility rate remains at its 2006 level through the
projection period;
￿ life expectancies at birth rise at rates akin to those in Statistics Canada’s
“medium” improvement;
￿ interprovincial migration for each age/sex category goes from its 
2001 – 2006 average in 2007 down to zero over 10 years; and
￿ net international migration for each province in each age/sex category
continues at its 2001 – 2006 average through the projection period.
Each province’s GDP is the product of its projected working-age population (18
to 64 years) times a productivity index of output per potential worker. Future
growth in each province’s index occurs at the same rate as the equivalent
national measure did during the stable-inflation period from 1994 to 2006: 2.1
percent annually.
2 C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder
1 This study also looks at the territories. For the sake of conciseness, the term “provincial” covers
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2 Age/sex breakdowns from the Canadian Institute for Health Information are prorated to match
aggregate national spending for 2006.
3 Proper measures of the volume of services provided in health and education are elusive, because
taking account of the quality of the outputs is so hard. Linking volume of services per person to
output per person is arbitrary, but has the virtue of clarifying the demographic issues: with no
change in the ratio of service recipients to potential workers, increases in volumes of services
delivered that matched productivity increases would imply no change in the share of real output
consumed by these services. 
4 True measures of price change in health and education are elusive for the same reason that proper
measures of volume of services are elusive, so the government consumption deflator is a convenient,
though highly imperfect, measure of inflation. Note also that actual increases in government
consumption deflators have varied considerably from province to province, as have actual increases
in output per working-age person. Since some of these variations reflect cyclical influences and
particular provincial circumstances over the 1994 – 2006 period, the projections use common national
figures for both.
5 Statistics Canada’s Financial Management System (2006, 27-28) shows both provincial and local
spending on elementary and secondary education; since provinces now largely control these budgets,
I show the total as provincial.
6 Provincial spending in 2006 is from SPSD/M, Release 14.1 (responsibility for use and interpretation
rests with the author). I thank Finn Poschmann for his assistance in producing these figures.
7 Provincial spending is from SPSD/M; federal spending on the Child Benefit is from the Public
Accounts.
The next step is to take current patterns of expenditure for four major program
categories:
￿ Healthcare. Six age groups for each sex in each province
2 are projected on the
assumptions that service intensity — the volume of services provided per
person — in each group rises at the same rate as the productivity index: 2.1
percent annually.
3 Health-sector inflation is projected at 2.2 percent — the
average annual increase in the national deflator for government consumption
expenditures since 1994;
4
￿ Education. Provincial spending
5 on elementary school students is projected
from provincial populations aged 4 to 17 years, and spending on
postsecondary students is projected from populations aged 18 to 24. As with
health, service intensity — real instruction expenses per student — grows with
the productivity index at 2.1 percent annually, and inflation in education grows
at 2.2 percent, in line with historical increases in the government consumption
deflator. Federal grants to students grow with the population of 18- to-
24-year-olds and the same index of service intensity, while the fixed-dollar
Canada Education Saving Grant changes with the population of pre-university
age: 0 to 17 years.
￿ Elderly benefits. The key data for projecting elderly benefits are inflation-
adjusted benefits per person age 65 and up for federal Old Age Security,
Guaranteed Income Supplement and Allowances. These are calculated using
projections for these programs from the federal Chief Actuary (OCA 2005).
Since the provinces with such programs do not provide similar projections, the
per-senior costs of provincial programs are assumed to rise at the same rate as
those of the federal programs.
6
￿ Child and family benefits. Most spending is projected from populations aged 
0 to 17, on the assumption that all relevant per-child amounts rise with inflation.
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The Results
Projected national costs for each program type for both levels of government,
expressed as shares of GDP, appear in Figure 1. Demographic change will raise
their aggregate cost from slightly less than 15 percent of GDP in the next decade
to almost 20 percent by 2056. To provide perspective relative to today’s economy,
a five percentage-point increase represents an added tax burden of $75 billion a
year — or about $3,500 per working person — to finance a comparable per-
beneficiary program mix. This is more than total provincial personal income-tax
collections in 2006/07, and more than double Ottawa’s revenue from the Goods
and Services Tax for the same year.
In two important senses, the national total understates the difficulties
Canadians will have dealing with this implicit liability. First, current spending
patterns and demographic forces differ considerably from province to province:
Quebec and the Atlantic provinces face more difficult situations than provinces
from Ontario westward. Second, the overwhelming source of the trouble — the
rising healthcare costs of an aging population — is the responsibility of the
provinces to bear. While Ottawa provides some transfer payments notionally
linked to healthcare, the goods and services devoted to actual care are financed
from provincial budgets.
An illuminating summary measure of the size of these implicit obligations is
the value of the difference between the share of GDP any individual program 
(or all programs together) draws on today and the share it (or they) will draw in
the future, discounted to a present value. The inspiration for this measure is that
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Total as % of 
2007 GDP 
Canada  -1,904.4    234.1    52.1    240.3    -1,377.8    -91 
Nfld & Lab.  -42.7    4.7    -0.2    0.1    -38.2    -148 
P.E.I.  -6.1    0.9    --     --     -5.2    -115 
Nova Scotia  -54.6    5.8    --     0.2    -48.6    -146 
New Brunswick  -45.0    5.1    -0.0    0.1    -39.8    -151 
Quebec  -421.1    4.6    --     --     -416.5    -140 
Ontario  -742.1    134.6    0.2    3.1    -604.2    -103 
Manitoba  -47.1    5.7    0.0    --     -41.4    -88 
Saskatchewan  -30.5    4.4    0.0    --     -26.0    -55 
Alberta  -236.0    18.7    -2.6    1.1    -218.7    -87 
B.C.  -261.2    34.7    0.0    0.5    -226.0    -119 
Yukon  -5.3    0.2    --     --     -5.2    -309 
NWT & Nunavut  -12.6    1.1    --     --     -11.5    -204 
Federal  --     13.7    54.6    235.1    303.4    20 
Provincial/Territorial  -1,904.4    220.5    -2.5    5.2    -1,681.2    -111 
 
Table 1:  Demographically Driven Implicit Assets and Liabilities ($bn except as noted)
healthcare, for example, the dominant political discourse treats the current mix
of health services as a “right” of citizenship, and implies that it will continue to
be available in the future on terms similar to those of the present — presumably
including a tax cost like that now paid. Since the promise is a political one, an
appropriate time-horizon over which to consider its cost would be the life
expectancy of the median-age Canadian — roughly 50 years.
Discounting the change in a program’s share of GDP over 50 years produces
a figure that can supplement other measures of government net worth (Table 1).
As discussed earlier, they can be characterized as implicit assets or liabilities,
which measure the gap between the implicit promises to beneficiaries of public
programs and the implicit promises to taxpayers. In that sense, they resemble
the bonus that net assets, and the wedge that net debt, put between programs
and taxes, or the unfunded liabilities in the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans
(C/QPP) that will make future contributors pay more than the actuarial cost of
their benefits.
The critical message from Table 1 is that demographic change combined with
unchanged patterns of age-specific spending will put enormous pressure on
government budgets in Canada. The total net liability across the country is not
far short of $1.4 trillion — 91 percent of 2007 GDP. While there are good reasons
not to want to fully prefund an obligation of this size, the discounting
calculation gives a sense of the scale of the task: to provide the current age-
specific package of programs without raising taxes over the next half century
would require a stock of assets — assuming it earned an annual return of 4.8
Note: Negative sign indicates liability.
Source:  Author’s calculations as described in text.6 C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder
percent — of $1.378 trillion.
8 The contributions of different types of programs to
this total are different enough to warrant a brief review:
Healthcare
The age/sex profile of spending interacts with demographic change to create
dramatic increases in healthcare spending. More rapidly aging provinces,
notably in the east, face powerful pressure. Countrywide, the projected increase
in health budgets’ share of GDP over the coming half-century creates an
aggregate liability of more than $1.9 trillion.
Education
In education, declining school- and postsecondary-age populations create a net
asset, especially for provinces. The total national implicit asset related to
education is almost $235 billion.
Elderly benefits
Perhaps surprisingly, elderly benefits do not loom large as an implicit item on
government balance sheets, and the largest figure is an implicit asset for the
federal government amounting to some $55 billion. The key factor behind this
result is that seniors’ benefits are indexed to prices only. With productivity
growth strong enough to offset the declining number of working-age people
relative to seniors — for which a 2.1 percent annual growth in output per
potential worker is sufficient — real income growth outpaces the cost of these
benefits over time.
9 While the bulge of older babyboomers does drive the cost of
these programs higher than current levels between 2020 and the late 2030s,
moreover, they drop relative to GDP before 2020, which weighs heavily in a
discounted calculation.
Child benefits
Child and family benefits shrink over time, creating an implicit asset of some
$240 billion nationwide. Nearly all of this budgetary relief occurs at the federal
8 This total is considerably larger than the $810 billion calculated on a similar basis in Robson
(2006). While the interactive nature of the calculations makes additive breakdown of the changes
since that study impossible, key factors are:
￿ The assumption that inflation in health and education will be 2.2 percent (the increase in the
government consumption deflator since 1994) rather than 2.0 percent as in the previous study.
￿ Healthcare spending hikes in the past year, which increased the exposure of governments to
aging-related healthcare costs in the future.
￿ The advance of time by one year, which brings one year closer the date at which the pressure of
the baby boom’s aging ramps up healthcare and seniors’ benefit costs.
￿ Use of a market interest rate (the long Ontario bond rate of 4.8 percent) rather than the
arbitrary 5 percent rate used in the previous study. At a 5 percent discount rate, the net liability
would be $1,286 billion; at a 6 percent discount rate, it would be $916 billion.
9 The projections of the Chief Actuary (OCA 2005) show a rising ratio of payments in these
programs relative to GDP because they assume a lower growth rate of output per worker.C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 7
level: Ottawa provides several benefits that are geared to youngsters, who will
form a shrinking share of the population. Being cash rather than services, these
benefits will also tend to shrink relative to incomes as productivity rises over time.
The Larger Fiscal Context 
The tally in Table 2 represents an attempt to put the assets and liabilities
associated with demographically sensitive programs into a framework that
allows comparison to other measures of governments’ fiscal positions. So it
makes sense to show these totals alongside three other important amounts: the
unfunded liabilities of the C/QPP system; the implicit government asset of
deferred taxes on private pension saving; and the familiar cumulative budget
surpluses and deficits of the federal and provincial governments.
The Canada and Quebec Pension Plans
In assessing the financial condition of the CPP, the Office of the Chief Actuary
estimates the amount of money the CPP would need to have on hand to pay
benefits accrued to date if further benefit accruals and contributions were to
cease. The difference between that obligation and the assets in the plan is its

















Total as % 
of 2007 GDP 
Canada Total  -1,377.8    -812.9    473.9    -749.4    -2,466.2    -163 
Nfld. & Lab.  -38.2    -6.4    2.3    -12.4    -54.7    -212 
P.E.I.  -5.2    -1.7    0.6    -1.4    -7.8    -172 
Nova Scotia  -48.6    -11.8    4.5    -12.7    -68.5    -205 
New Brunswick  -39.8    -9.4    3.0    -7.2    -53.4    -203 
Quebec  -416.5    -96.5    56.0    -106.8    -563.8    -189 
Ontario  -604.2    -157.4    70.3    -137.3    -828.6    -141 
Manitoba  -41.4    -14.1    5.6    -10.8    -60.8    -129 
Saskatchewan  -26.0    -11.7    4.4    -5.5    -38.9    -83 
Alberta  -218.7    -41.5    19.8    33.1    -207.3    -83 
B.C.  -226.0    -54.8    17.9    -21.2    -284.1    -150 
Yukon  -5.2    -0.4    0.1    0.1    -5.3    -317 
NWT and 
Nunavut 
-11.5    -0.8    0.4    0.0    -11.8    -211 
Federal  303.4    -406.5    289.1    -467.3    -281.3    -19 
Table 2:  Demographically Driven Balances in Broader Context ($bn except as noted)
Note: Negative sign indicates liability.
Sources: OCA 2007; Public Accounts data; Statistics Canada; author’s calculations.8 C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder
an estimate of the unfunded liability, the similarity of the QPP to the CPP allows
a reasonable approximation.
The most recent actuarial valuation of the CPP (OCA 2007) estimated its
unfunded liability at $620 billion in 2007. If the unfunded liability of the QPP is
proportional to the ratio of Quebec’s population age 18 and over to that of the
rest of Canada — 31 percent — it would stand at $193 billion.
Dividing these amounts across the country involves some arbitrary
judgements. The CPP is formally a joint federal-provincial program, while the
QPP is a provincial program that is required to offer similar benefits. For
consistency, I therefore allocate half the unfunded liability of the CPP and QPP
alike to the federal government. The rest of the QPP’s liability appears as an
obligation of the Quebec government. 
In principle, the non-federal half of the CPP’s liability could be allocated among
the provinces in proportion to the benefits under the program accrued by
participants to date if they are still working, and while they were working if they
are retired. This exercise would require examination of the work histories of current
and former CPP contributors — for convenience, I allocate the liability according to
provincial shares of the population 18 and over for Canada outside Quebec. The
result, shown in the second column of Table 2, is a net obligation for Canadian
governments of some $813 billion, of which half is federal, and the rest provincial.
Deferred Taxes on Private Pension Saving
A further sensible addition to this evaluation of long-term fiscal positions is tax
that will be payable on savings in employer-sponsored registered pension plans
or registered retirement saving plans (RPP/RRSPs) when they are taken into
personal income. Data from the national balance sheet accounts show the assets
in RPPs at $789 billion in mid-2007; the 2005 Survey of Financial Security put the
value of RRSPs and related funds at $593 billion — if their growth has paced
growth in GDP, they would stand at $656 billion in 2007, giving a total for both
types of retirement savings of $1,445 billion. 
A handful of assumptions (as in Robbins and Veall 2002) permit a valuation
of these assets that is comparable with other financial liabilities and assets. I
assume that a 20 percent average federal tax rate will apply to the distributions
from these plans,
10 and use this figure plus the distribution of personal income-
tax collections in fiscal year 2006/07 from Statistics Canada’s Financial
Management System to obtain tax collections for the provinces.
11 I also assume
that the rate of return on investments in these plans will be the same as my 4.8
percent discount rate, which makes the present value of tax-deferred pension
savings to governments equal to the amount saved times the pertinent tax rate.
10 The 20 percent figure is from Robbins and Veall (2002). It assumes a considerably higher average
tax rate on future pension income than the federal personal income tax currently imposes on all
income, so a more cautious assessment of the fiscal outlook might use a lower figure.
11 Statistics Canada, CANSIM, Table 385-0001. Ideally, the distribution of future tax collections
among the provinces would reflect the actual drawdown of pension savings by seniors in each
one, but those projections would require more detail on the holding of assets by age and
geography than is available.C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 9
This reasoning yields a total asset for all governments of close to $475 billion, of
which about $290 billion is federal.
Public-Accounts Net Debt
The third column in Table 2 simply shows the most recent net debt figures for
the federal and provincial-local governments as shown in their respective public
accounts. These figures are imperfect: for most governments, they include only
financial assets on the credit side, and understate some liabilities, such as public-
service pensions. Because of their familiarity and wide acceptance, however,
they seem the best figures to include in this tally.
The total of all these items — a demographically augmented balance sheet —
appears in the final column of Table 2. At $2.5 trillion, or about 160 percent of
2007 GDP, the net obligation for the country as a whole is more than three times
the net figure in the more familiar public-accounts balance sheets alone. Adding
the demographically driven assets and liabilities to government balance sheets
shows that aging will boost the tax cost of the programs and transfers Canadians
now enjoy, notwithstanding the implicit assets arising from a relatively smaller
young population in the future and the fact that deferred taxes on pension
savings will one day become payable.
Summary and Implications
The key message from this review is that implicit liabilities from healthcare are
Canadian governments’ biggest long-term fiscal challenge, with an implicit
liability of some $1.9 trillion facing the provinces. Seniors’ benefits, as currently
designed, will likely have relatively small impacts on government budgets, and
the projected decline in the draw of education and child benefits on Canadian
incomes will partially offset the rising cost of healthcare. Nevertheless, at almost
$1.4 trillion, Canadian governments’ total net demographically driven liability
dwarfs their on-budget debts and the unfunded liabilities of the C/QPP.
Deferred taxes on private pension saving are significant, but nowhere near
enough to cover these explicit and implicit claims on Canadians’ future incomes.
Preparing for the squeeze that will begin in earnest around the end of the
next decade requires action on several fronts. 
￿ Foremost is a restoration of fiscal discipline. Consistent budget over-runs
at all levels over the past decade (Adrian, Guillemette and Robson 2007)
have caused governments to pay down less debt than would otherwise
be the case, kept taxes higher than they otherwise would be, and inflated
costs in programs that will experience more upward pressure in the
future. Holding inflation in health and education to the same 2 percent
rate assumed for the rest of the economy would, by itself, reduce the
demographically driven liability to less than $1 trillion. 
￿ Fiscal discipline in Ottawa is crucial, so federal taxes can come down and
make more room for the revenue provinces will need in the future.
￿ In addition to paying down on-budget debt, Canadian governments
could prefund some of the healthcare sub-programs in which rapidly10 C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder
escalating costs are foreseeable. While it is neither practical nor desirable
to try amassing an investment fund as large as the entire implicit liability
calculated here, partial prefunding of individual programs, such as drug
programs for the elderly, could spread the much higher future costs of
these programs through time.
12
Finally, and fundamentally, bolstering the economic base of each province and
the country as a whole through growth-friendly policies is a critical approach to
alleviating the pressure of these programs. Assume a half-percent increase in
productivity growth from its recent value, not accompanied by a similar change
in health and education service intensity, and the present value of the
demographically driven liability drops by some 75 percentage points of current
GDP. An increase in productivity growth to a little above 2.5 percent annually
would eliminate the national net liability; an increase in productivity growth to
slightly more than 2.75 percent would eliminate the aggregate provincial-level
liability, and let Canadians as a whole look forward to devoting a smaller share
of their future incomes to these programs (Figure 2).
Aging and a slower-growing workforce threaten a massive increase in the fiscal
cost of age-sensitive public programs in Canada. Canadians need fiscal discipline,






1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25 2.50 2.75 3.00 3.25 3.50








National Total Federal Provincial
Figure 2:  Demographically Driven Liability as Share of GDP with Different Productivity Growth Rates
12 A parallel here is with the partial prefunding of the C/QPP, which did not undo all the
intergenerational inequities in the plans, but has contained the rise in contribution rates that
would otherwise occur. Robson (2002) shows how this approach could work for health programs.
Source: Author’s  calculations.C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 11
References
Adrian, Reid S., Yvan Guillemette and William Robson. 2007. “Missed Targets: Canada’s 2007
Fiscal Accountability Ranking.” C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 100. Toronto: March.
Office of the Chief Actuary (OCA). 2005. Actuarial Report (7th) on the Old Age Security Program, as at
31 December 2003. Ottawa: Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions.
Office of the Chief Actuary (OCA). 2007. Actuarial Report (23rd) on the Canada Pension Plan, as at 31
December 2006. Ottawa: Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions.
Robbins, Jenna, and Michael Veall. 2002. Registered Saving Plan Holdings as a Government Asset. C.D.
Howe Institute Backgrounder 63. Toronto.
Robson, William. 2006. “Time and Money: Tracking the Fiscal Impact of Demographic Change in
Canada.” C.D. Howe Institute e-brief. Toronto.
________________. 2003. Time and Money: The Fiscal Impact of Demographic Change in Canada. C.D.
Howe Institute Commentary 185. Toronto.
________________. 2002. Saving for Health: Pre-Funding Health Care for an Older Canada. C.D. Howe
Institute Commentary 170. Toronto.
Statistics Canada. 2007. Public Sector Statistics: Financial Management System, 2006/07. Catalogue no.
68 213. Ottawa: Minister of Industry.Recent C.D. Howe Institute Publications
December 2007 Kotowski, Maciej. Insuring Canada’s Exports: The Case for Reform at Export Development Canada. C.D. Howe
Institute Commentary 257.
December 2007 Koning, John-Paul. “Why the Bank of Canada Act Needs Updating: A Lesson from the Sub-Prime
Crisis.” C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
November 2007 Jaccard, Mark. Designing Canada’s Low-Carb Diet: Options for Effective Climate Policy. Benefactors Lecture
2007.
November 2007 Banerjee, Robin. “Deals on Wheels: An Analysis of the New Federal Auto Feebate.” C.D. Howe Institute
Backgrounder 108.
November 2007 Freedman, Charles and Clyde Goodlet. Financial Stability: What It Is and Why It Matters. C.D. Howe
Institute Commentary 256.
November 2007 Guillemette, Yvan and William B.P. Robson. “Realistic Expectations: Demographics and the Pursuit of
Prosperity in Saskatchewan.” C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 107.
October 2007 Macmillan, Kathleen E. and Patrick Grady. “A New Prescription: Can the BC-Alberta TILMA Resuscitate
Internal Trade in Canada?” C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 106.
October 2007 Richards, John. Reducing Poverty: What has Worked, and What Should Come Next. C.D. Howe Institute
Commentary 255.
October 2007 Guillemette, Yvan. “Breaking Down Monopolies: Expanding Choice and Competition in Education.” 
C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 105.
September 2007 Mintz, Jack M. The 2007 Tax Competitiveness Report: A Call for Comprehensive Tax Reform. C.D. Howe
Institute Commentary 254.
September 2007 Chen, Duanjie, Jack Mintz and Andrey Tarasov. “The High-Tax Handicap: How the World’s Major
Economies Shoot Themselves in the Foot with High Corporate Income Tax Rates.” C.D. Howe Institute e-
brief.
September 2007 Johnson, David. “School Grades: Identifying Alberta’s Best Public Schools”. C.D. Howe Institute
Backgrounder 104.
August 2007 Vaillancourt, Francois, Dominique Lemay and Luc Vaillancourt. “Laggards No More: The Changed
Socioeconomic Status of Francophones in Quebec.” C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 103.
août 2007 Vaillancourt, François, Dominique Lemay and Luc Vaillancourt. “Le français plus payant : L’évolution du
statut socio-économique des francophones au Québec.” Bulletin de recherche 103.
August 2007 Robson, William B.P. “Stuck on a Spoke: Proliferating Bilateral Trade Deals are a Dangerous Game for
Canada.” C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
July 2007 Smart, Michael. Lessons in Harmony: What Experience in the Atlantic Provinces Shows About the Benefits of a
Harmonized Sales Tax. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 253.
July 2007 Laidler, David. Better Late Than Never: Towards a Systematic Review of Canada’s Monetary Policy Regime. 
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 252.
July 2007 Chen, Duanjie, Jack Mintz and Andrey Tarasov. “Federal and Provincial Tax Reforms: Let’s Get Back on
Track.” C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 102.
June 2007 Koeppl, Thorsten V., and James MacGee. Branching Out: The Urgent Need to Transform Canada’s Financial
Landscape and How to Do It. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 251.
June 2007 Jaccard, Mark, and Nic Rivers. “Estimating the Effect of the Canadian Government’s 2006-2007
Greenhouse Gas Policies.” C.D. Howe Institute Working Paper.
June 2007 Jaccard, Mark, and Nic Rivers. “Estimating the Effect of the Canadian Government’s 2006-2007
Greenhouse Gas Policies.” C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
June 2007 Laidler, David, and William B. P. Robson. Ill-Defined Benefits: The Uncertain Present and Brighter Future of
Employee Pensions in Canada. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 250.
June 2007 Kneebone, Ronald, D. Following the Money: Federal and Provincial Budget Balances with Canada’s Major
Cities. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 249.C
.
D
.
 
H
o
w
e
 
I
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
6
7
 
Y
o
n
g
e
 
S
t
r
e
e
t
,
 
S
u
i
t
e
 
3
0
0
T
o
r
o
n
t
o
,
 
O
n
t
a
r
i
o
M
5
E
 
1
J
8
C
a
n
a
d
i
a
n
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
M
a
i
l
 
S
a
l
e
s
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
A
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
 
#
4
0
0
0
8
8
4
8